How to empower Ukraine and bring Moscow back to the table
Reuters
By Jan H. Kalicki
July 7 (Reuters) – Despite strong pressure from the Kremlin,
the European Union voted to support the United States in
maintaining targeted sanctions on Russia because of its
occupation of Ukrainian land. But just continuing the current
sanctions on Moscow is not enough to restore Kyiv’s territorial
integrity.
What is needed is a series of steps that would strengthen
Ukraine’s economy and security – as well as re-engage Russia in
a broader relationship with the West. A viable strategy could
combine an array of pressures and incentives that would extend
far beyond the current sanctions.
At the core of this strategy is the proposition that Ukraine
can fashion a viable future, territorially intact, between
Russia and Europe. This was possible for Austria at the height
of the Cold War, though it was positioned at the crossroads of
East and West. The 1955 State Treaty reestablished Austria as an
independent nation and removed Soviet (as well as Western)
occupation forces. This should also be possible for Ukraine
today.
To achieve this goal, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko
needs greater international support in his efforts to institute
government reform. Economically, this would mean more concrete
assistance from the International Monetary Fund, the European
Union and the United States. Militarily, this would mean
defensive assistance to Ukraine if Russian heavy weaponry is not
removed from the eastern separatist regions.
It would be unrealistic to seek a military balance, which
would likely prompt escalation. But the West cannot consign Kyiv
to an economic and security vacuum, which could only invite more
aggressive steps by the separatists and their Russian
supporters. In return for international support, Kyiv must
maintain and intensify its own reforms.
General Philip Breedlove, military commander of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, warns that Russian forces have
“reset and repositioned” and may be preparing for a fresh
offensive in Ukraine. To deter such a move, the West would need
not only to reaffirm existing sanctions but also to demonstrate
it is ready to increase them by preparing an expanded list of
Russian firms and individuals to be sanctioned. Defensive
military support of Ukraine, including training, intelligence
and equipment, should be an integral part of any robust Western
response.
At the same time, an effective Western strategy could
re-engage Russia productively. The starting point is to lay out
which programs would be implemented if Ukraine’s territorial
integrity is restored – working with Moscow to establish an
economic and security relationship based on respect and mutual
benefit.
It is critical for the building blocks to be mutually
defined, but past East-West agreements suggest some likely
contours. Economically, higher value investment and trade, with
added technology, can be restored in a post-sanctions
environment in which Russia would also undertake the necessary
economic and legal reforms that are in its own interest. One
example, ruled out under present sanctions, would be
nonconventional-energy development in Siberia and Russia’s far
north.
In security terms, both sides would benefit from
de-escalating tensions along NATO borders, on everything from
military deployments to cyberattacks. Adequate progress in
post-sanctions relations could be reflected, in turn, by
reactivating Russia’s membership in the G-8 as well as the
NATO-Russia Council.
Against this backdrop, the future of Ukraine could be
approached in a more hopeful vein. Kyiv’s reformers have their
work cut out for them, but tangible Western support could
reinforce their position at this critical point. The Kremlin,
meanwhile, would have the choice of re-engaging with the West in
a concretely positive way rather than confronting sanctions and
other strictures.
Like Austria with its State Treaty, Ukraine could then
pursue trade and investment ties with the East as well as the
West. Kyiv would mirror Vienna in that it also would not join
NATO. But Kyiv could qualify for association with – and perhaps
ultimately membership in – the European Union. Ukraine could
then be removed as a major point of East-West contention, as
Austria was during the Cold War, with positive benefits for the
entire region.
Would the Kremlin come to support such an approach? Here,
the jury is still out. President Vladimir Putin’s third term
has been characterized by strong criticism of the West, moves to
engage with the East and failure to implement the Minsk II
agreement restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Sanctions alone have not been able to change this situation.
Only a strategy that provides a positive framework for both
sides could lead to a different outcome.
There is, potentially, much to gain and little to lose by
trying it.
(Jan H. Kalicki)
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