Forum: With ceasefire breaking down, Ukraine becoming another frozen conflict



In early September, representatives of Ukraine, Russia and the pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine agreed in Minsk, Belarus, to a 12-point protocol that included a ceasefire in the conflict that had raged throughout the Donetsk and Luhansk regions since April between the separatists, supported by Russia, and Ukrainian troops.

But after two months of intermittent but frequent skirmishes along the frontlines and shelling of the Donetsk airport, the bogus elections organized by the separatists in their self-declared People’s Republics, and the recent entry of convoys of Russian tanks and trucks hauling large artillery pieces, air defense systems, and special forces, it is increasingly apparent that the ceasefire is breaking down and Ukraine is being partitioned, the victim of yet another “frozen conflict” in the post-Soviet space.

The September ceasefire was to a large extent the result of Ukraine’s success in July and August in driving back the separatists from a considerable portion of the territory they took in April to the area in and around the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk. By the end of August, Luhansk had been cut off from water and electricity for several weeks and partially retaken and Donetsk had been encircled and cut off from supplies. Indeed, Russia had found it necessary to dispatch several hundred trucks in a “humanitarian convoy” to eastern Ukraine.

Ukraine appeared to be on the verge of defeating the separatists. But it was also apparent that Russia would not let that to happen. As the Ukrainian military drove the separatists back into their enclaves, Russia countered by deploying up to 40,000 combat-ready troops, including airborne assault and special forces as well as tanks, heavy artillery, and antiaircraft weapons on the border. It appeared increasingly likely that if Ukraine persisted with its offensive, Russia would undertake a “peacemaking” military intervention designed to preserve the separatists’ control of the territory they still held.

It was at that point that German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who had been in close touch with Russian President Vladimir Putin, intervened. Making her first trip to Kyiv since the fall of 2013, she persuaded Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko to stop attacking Donetsk and Luhansk and agree to a ceasefire with the separatists. At some political cost to himself, Poroshenko agreed and his personal emissary, former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, signed the Minsk Protocol on Sept. 5.

The protocol committed Ukraine to decentralizing power from Kyiv to the regions, including through adoption of a law granting special status to the local governments in the parts of eastern Ukraine controlled by the separatists and allowing local elections in those areas. The separatists and Russia agreed, for their part, to withdraw all illegal military forces and equipment and to observe the ceasefire and to observe the international border.

Over the past two months, Ukraine adhered to most of the terms of the protocol. For example, in September, it granted special status to the local governments in the areas controlled by the separatists. It did, however, continue the fight for control of the Donetsk airport, engaged in frequent skirmishes along the front lines, and continued to shell the cities and suburbs of Donetsk and Luhansk. The separatists, for their part, violated the protocol by organizing elections on Nov. 2 for the leadership of their People’s Republics instead of waiting until December to hold local elections under Ukrainian authority as agreed at Minsk. And Russia blithely disregarded the protocol and sent large numbers of Russian tanks, trucks and military equipment into eastern Ukraine and deployed more than 6,000 combat-ready Russian troops on the border.

While Putin’s intentions are not entirely clear, it seems increasingly likely that Russia intends to “freeze” the conflict in eastern Ukraine by assisting the People’s Republics in consolidating the territory they control and arranging for the creation of a de facto “statelet” in eastern Ukraine much like Transnistria in Moldova and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. Ukraine has, paradoxically, contributed to that development by terminating all state pensions for residents in the two republics and, most recently, terminating all Ukrainian public and financial services.

But Russia’s ambitions may extend beyond the creation of a pseudo-state in the territory now controlled by the separatists for one important reason: Crimea. Annexed in March, Crimea, with a population of 2.4 million and the home base of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, depends on Ukraine for 80 percent of its electricity and water, two-thirds of its food, and almost all of its oil products and coal. Ukraine continues to provide it with electricity and water but it has cut off rail and road ties and both coal, used widely in rural areas for heat, and food are in scarce supply.

Russia has no direct overland access to Crimea. It intends to build a rail and road link across the Kerch Strait in the future but, in the meantime, must rely on ferries to move supplies there. Ferries, of course, can be interrupted by bad weather, as they were for a week in late October, and by ice in the winter. Ukraine understands what is at stake and will presumably grant Russia overland access to Crimea. But if it doesn’t, the “frozen conflict” will surely heat up again.

David R. Cameron is a professor of political science and the director of Yale’s Program in European Union Studies.