News.Kyiv.Me.

A “Plan B” for Brussels ‘s Policies towards
Kyiv

ABSTRACT:
After the manipulated elections to Ukraine ‘s Verkhovna Rada in October 2012, Brussels ‘ relations with Kyiv are in deadlock. Ukraine is not fulfilling the conditions for signing the
already initialed Association Agreement with the EU. Against this background,
we outline an eight-point plan of further and alternative actions. We recommend
(1) a clearer EU statement on the preconditions for signing the Association
Agreement, (2) leaking the Agreement’s text, (3) signing Association Agreements
with Moldova and Georgia, (4) offering these two countries conditional EU
membership perspectives, (5) accelerating the visa liberalization process with
Ukraine, (6) supporting current Ukrainian efforts at sectoral approximation
with the EU, (7) engaging with some of Ukraine’s “oligarchs,” and (8)
creating a Ukrainian research and information center. We conclude with a brief
reminder on the geopolitical relevance of Ukraine .

By
Iryna Solonenko ( European University Viadrina of Frankfurt/Oder) and Andreas Umland ( National University of ” Kyiv-Mohyla Academy “)

In summer this year, Ukraine and the European
Union finally initialed a far-reaching Association Agreement. Apart from paving
the way for a close political association between Kyiv and Brussels , this unique
treaty text includes extensive provisions for a Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Area. If signed, ratified and implemented, the Association Agreement –
the EU’s largest ever treaty with a non-member state – would make Ukraine part and parcel of
the European integration process. The Agreement would put the relations between
Kyiv and Brussels on entirely new
grounds, and provide for a comprehensive “Europeanization” of Ukraine ‘s economy,
political system, and public administration. It could one day be seen as having
been the first step towards a full membership of Ukraine in the EU.

In view of how the Ukrainian
parliamentary elections of October 28, 2012 , went, the
prospects of signing the Association Agreement anytime soon look now, however, dim.
After the last EU-Ukraine Summit of December 2011, Brussels had repeatedly made
clear that the quality of these elections will be decisive for the future of the
EU-Ukraine relationship. Two further conditions, namely ending selective
justice against political opposition leaders, and implementing the reform
priorities – above all legal reforms – outlined in the bilateral Association
Agenda were also voiced. Yet, the vague language and cautious communication of
these conditions indicated that the EU also wanted to leave some room for maneuver,
in case not all of them would be fully met. Unfortunately, however, extensive manipulations
took place both, before elections day, and during the counting and tabulation
of votes leading the deputy head of Ukraine ‘s Central
Electoral Commission Zhanna Usenko-Chernaia to admit that the October poll was
the “dirtiest [parliamentary] election in the history of independent Ukraine .” This leaves
little freedom of action for Brussels ahead of the
foreign ministers meeting where the fate of the Association Agreement and future
of the EU’s policy towards Ukraine is to be discussed.

What should the EU now, that
the Association Agreement seems off the table, do? Below, we present a list of
concrete steps that the EU should consider undertaking soon. We are here not repeating
general calls for more support of civil society initiatives, closer people-to-people
relations, or intensifying academic exchange. These suggestions are valid, to
be sure. Yet, not only have they been made before and are partly self-suggestive.
They will also take effect only in the mid or long term. What is now needed are
urgent steps that have the potential to re-intensify EU-Ukraine relations, in
the short run. We therefore suggest to:

1. Set out, in a single and
clearly formulated written document, the conditions Ukraine has to fulfill for
the EU to sign the Association Agreement! So far, there has been a cacophony of
EU representatives’ statements on this issue, including in writing. As a result,
it is unclear what exactly Brussels expects from Kyiv
in order to make association and free trade between EU and Ukraine feasible.

The exact formulation and mode
of communication of these conditions are important. Such a document should
reiterate the EU’s commitment to association and outline priority reform areas which
are prevalent, in the short-term perspective. These could be human rights and
fundamental freedoms, the functioning of the judiciary and public procurement
procedures, as well as the business climate. Those are areas which have seen
significant deterioration, but in which acts of political will could also bring
swift improvement. The issue of selective justice is more sensitive and
requires special attention. On the one hand, the EU cannot simply ignore the
fact that the leaders of political opposition are still in prison. On the other
hand, this condition might never be fulfilled and the EU-Ukraine relations will
be stuck indefinitely. We suggest that the EU mentions in the document that
Ukraine should ensure that decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are
implemented (the revelant cases are under the ECHR consideration) without
further specifications and condinue pressuring Ukraine’s authorities on this
issue via diplomatic channels. The EU’s statement has to be made public and be
presented as an appeal to the society as much as to the political elites. In
that way, such a document could become a common reference point and instrument of
domestic advocacy for various civic and political actors in Ukraine .  

2. Leak the text of the Association
Agreement – preferably, its Ukrainian-language version – to the public! So far,
the EU’s offer has been a pig in the poke: There is much talk about the treaty,
yet very few people have ever seen it. To be sure, the Agreement’s text is
reportedly very long, heavy reading, and full of technical terms. It is not to
be expected that millions of Ukrainians will start examining the text when it becomes
freely available. Yet, once leaked, journalists, politicians, business people,
lawyers and academics will start reading and analyzing those sections that
interest, and could become relevant to, them. While, perhaps, being fully
studied by only very few Ukrainian experts, the published Agreement text may,
as a reference point and quotations source, substantially change Ukrainian public
discourse about European integration and Ukraine’s role in it.

3. Sign and ratify the Association
Agreements with Moldova and Georgia once negotiations
are concluded, and do not wait for Ukraine ! This way, the EU would
kill two birds at once: First, Brussels will show that its
announced More-for-More Principle does indeed apply which should strengthen the
credibility of its Eastern Partnership policy. Second, an EU association with Moldova and Georgia will embarrass the
current Ukrainian leadership, in the eyes of Ukraine ‘s pro-European
elites, if not parts of the population, at large. Ukraine had, under
President Yushchenko, been the first country to start Association negotiations
with the EU in 2007. If now, however, Moldova and Georgia get Agreements that
have been modeled on the Ukrainian one, and start implementing, as well as
benefiting from, them, this would further undermine the legitimacy of
Yanukovych’s erratic foreign and domestic policies. Obviously, in the case of Georgia , signing the
Association Agreement should be made dependent on the Ivanishvili government’s
continuation of democratic reform policies, and strict observation of the rule
of law.

4. Consider giving Moldova and, possibly, Georgia too a conditional
and long-term, yet, nevertheless, unambiguous EU membership perspective!
Formulate this offer in a way as to make clear that it is, in the case of Moldova , unrelated to Romania ‘s pressure, and,
in the case of Georgia , not due to US
demands, i.e. in neither case an extra-ordinary decision. Indicate that such
offers may be made to other Eastern Partnership countries which respect common
values and show adequate political will, in the future too. This way, Ukraine ‘s elite and
society may finally understand that there is a real chance to join, one day,
the EU – if and only if Ukraine starts implementing
substantive reforms. Today, there are many people, even in the Ukrainian experts
community, who do not believe that Brussels will ever give Ukraine a serious chance
to try entering the EU. Explicit future accession prospects for Moldova or/and Georgia , however, will be
seen as an implicit membership perspective for Ukraine too – without
binding Brussels , in any way.

5. Accelerate the visa
liberalization process as much as possible! In a first step, the European
Parliament, should, sooner rather than later, ratify the already agreed
amendments to the Visa Facilitation Agreement. Second, the EU member states’
consulates should become more customer-oriented. The EU’s current restrictive
visa policies hurt ordinary Ukrainians. These policies’ often arbitrary
implementation in many consulates across Ukraine have already
heavily discredited the European Union in the eyes of tens of thousands of
Ukrainians. The EU consulates’ complicated visa application rules, heavy
processing fees, and sometimes inconsistent, if not ridiculous decision-making
on travel or work permits contrast sharply with Russia ‘s liberal
migration regime with Ukraine . Oddly, the EU
consulates’ policies are frequently slowing down and, sometimes, even hindering
Ukrainian-EU cooperation aiming to promote those reforms that Brussels is expecting to
accelerate. Third, the EU should reiterate that entirely visa-free travel will
become reality once Ukraine has implemented
the reform program outlined in the Visa Liberalization Action Plan.

6. Support Ukraine ‘s approximation efforts
in those sectors that are important for the future Association Agreement and
where no resistance from particularistic interests to their execution already
today exists! Down-to-earth technical standards will, in any way, have to be
implemented at some point. If it is possible to move forward already now
without yet having the official framework of the Association Agreement, the
opportunity to achieve instant progress should be grasped. Energy cooperation
requires special attention. East European energy security, diversification and
savings as well as modernisation of Ukraine ‘s gas
transportation system should be the EU’s particular focus for the next years. Concurrently,
implementation of the Russian South Stream project in the Black Sea – aimed at devaluing
Ukraine ‘s major strategic
asset, her pipelines network – should be prevented.

7. Engage more actively with
some of Ukraine ‘s so-called
“oligarchs”! Politics in Ukraine is, like in other
post-Soviet states, a two-level game: What is happening in the public domain is
only the tip of the iceberg of what is going on under the carpet. Often
substantive decisions in Ukraine are predetermined
behind the scenes by actors who may not hold any significant official posts,
but control significant parts of Ukraine ‘s GDP. These
“oligarchs” include a variety of personalities – some of whom are
more dubious, and some less so. With a selected circle of the latter, the EU
should seek a dialogue concerning what the EU wants from the Ukrainian
government, and what the Association Agreements means for Ukraine ‘s economy.   More communication with some of Ukraine ‘s grey cardinals
could facilitate closer relations in the official realm. Yet, the EU needs to
make sure that such communication is not perceived as an attempt on the part of
the EU to support non-transperant structures in Ukraine . We only suggest
diversifying channels of communication with Ukraine to include actors
who might be interested in bringing Ukraine closer to the EU.

8. Create a Ukraine research and
information center providing competent political, economic, social and legal
consulting, on current Ukrainian affairs! This center could be publishing a
weekly analytical bulletin as well as a monthly or, at least, bimonthly specialized
journal on Ukrainian politics, business, history, society etc. Such a center may
also hold annual conventions, monthly expert round-tables, irregular public
conferences, or occasional press conferences which would bring together
academic researchers, policy analysts, journalists, social activists, and
decision-makers dealing with Ukraine.

Much of what went wrong in the
EU’s policies towards Ukraine over the last
twenty years has to do with the shockingly scant knowledge, across Europe , about the territorially
largest European country. Even high-level bureaucrats in European foreign
ministries, chief administrators in major international organizations, influential
journalists in leading media outlets, or policy experts in top notch
think-tanks often operate with common places, stereotypes, and travesties when
it comes to Ukraine . No European
country has a center equivalent to the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute in Massachusetts , or the Canadian
Institute for Ukrainian Studies in Alberta . Europe needs at least one
analytical center that regularly produces and publishes topical investigations
and in-depth research, on contemporary Ukraine . While such a
center could also be partially or fully financed by the Ukrainian side, it
should be made sure that its scholarly competence, professional reputation,
distance to particularistic interests, and position above politics are beyond any
doubt.

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