Chicken Kyiv
In
September 2013, Russia unnerved the Baltic States and several NATO countries by
holding military exercises on the borders of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland,
and in the Kaliningrad enclave that involved an estimated 70,000 troops.
Earlier, in April, the Russian Air Force had practiced mock bombing runs near
Swedish air space. The unease caused by these events — along with many others,
including the resumption of a Russian Naval task force in the Mediterranean and
international flights of strategic
bombers — was considerable, prompting many analysts
to remark on the Russian military’s resurgent confidence and capability. It was
confidence and capability born of a massive modernizatsiia
program designed to remedy the inadequacies exposed by the 2008 war with
Georgia, and to create a modern, professional military capable of protecting
Russia’s status as a great power.
Today,
Russia is flexing that newfound military might in Crimea and on its eastern
border with Ukraine, where it is massing troops and carrying out a series of
military exercises. As the clock ticks down toward a referendum on secession for the Black Sea peninsula, fear is mounting about a full-scale invasion of the
Ukrainian heartland — this time, involving Russian troops with insignias on their uniforms. But as analysts speculate about
Moscow’s intentions, the question that led most observers to discount the
possibility of a Russian takeover of Crimea remains unanswered: To what end?
The
most likely answer is that the Crimean invasion — and the current military
exercises along the Ukrainian border — is intended to signal to the new
government in Kyiv that Russia’s interests are not to be ignored. In that case,
they would represent a continuation of Russia’s efforts to negate any incipient
relationship between Ukraine and the EU that would threaten Moscow’s influence
in the region. As my colleague and FP columnist Michael
Weiss notes, “That’s why the Kremlin has created a shadow EU known as the
Customs Union, which includes Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and whose sole
mission seems to be keeping ex-satellites from being lured into Brussels’
orbit.”
If
the efforts to “persuade” Ukraine to join the customs union — such as the $15
billion loan offered to President Viktor Yanukovych prior to his ouster — can
be seen as part of this strategy, then the latest military exercises are
probably just a more forceful iteration. These exercises are largely consistent
with the more muscular military posture Russia has adopted since 2008 — and don’t
involve the level of manpower needed to mount a full-scale invasion. In other
words, Russia is making a powerful political statement — and it may well hang
onto Crimea — but it’s not about to march on Kyiv.
Russia’s
ambitions are stamped onto the troop movements and military exercises
themselves. Clearly, Russia isn’t messing around in Crimea. The professionalism
and equipment displayed by the occupying troops are extremely telling,
displaying a level of command and control that only the Russian military would
be able to project. This professionalism suggests that the troops in Crimea
(other than the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade, which as part of the
Black Sea Fleet is ordinarily stationed in the peninsula) come from the elite
Airborne (VDV) and various Spetsnaz (special
forces) units: The 76th Guards Air Assault Division from Pskov, the 31st Guards
Airborne Brigade from Ulyanovsk, and the 45th Guards Independent Regiment (VDV)
located in Kubinka, outside Moscow, are all alleged to be in
Crimea. The 7th Guards Air Assault Division is also located next to Crimea in
Novorossiysk and could be involved.
Additionally,
there are numerous units in Russia’s Southern Military District (Russia is
broken up into four regional commands: Western, Southern, Central and Eastern) that
are most likely involved in the occupation of Crimea. The Southern MD covers
the restive Caucasus region, including the Russian “peacekeeping” operations in
the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It has priority over other
military districts for personnel and new equipment, and so would be a prime
candidate to contribute to the ongoing operations in Crimea. The 22nd
Spetsnaz Brigade, which is subordinate to the Southern MD, is also
allegedly in Crimea.
Regardless
of which forces are actually in Crimea, the numbers and capabilities pale in
comparison to the very real and very public displays of Russian military might
on the Ukrainian border, which Andriy Parubiy, the head of Ukraine’s National
Security and Defense Council, claims involve 80,000 solders, 270 tanks, 370
artillery systems, and 140 combat aircraft. Still, these numbers must be taken
with a grain of salt; because Parubiy’s statement is meant to sound alarm bells
in the West, his estimates most likely include troops and hardware that are
normally stationed in the region.
That’s
not to say Ukraine has nothing to worry about. Given that Russia has conducted military
district wide maneuvers, air defense exercises, and airborne troop parachute drops, Parubiy’s claims are not the
musings of a hyperbolic politician. On February 26, Moscow ordered a massive,
150,00-troop exercise involving units from the western and central military
districts (The Central MD’s 2nd Army in Samara is available to be mobilized in
the event of war to support the Western and Southern MD’s, which border
Ukraine). Then on Tuesday, it announced that the 98th Guards Airborne Division,
based in Ivanovo outside of Moscow, would be conducting a parachute drop into
Rostov — which directly borders Ukraine. Additionally, Russia has launched
large scale exercises involving its air defense forces — including advanced S-300
and Buk M1 air defense systems — and
dispatched 6 additional Su-27 fighters to Belarus, possibly as a response to
America’s decision to send 6 F-15 fighters to the Baltics and a dozen F-16’s to
Poland.
But
as menacing as these maneuvers might seem, they are fairly standard from a
readiness perspective. As Mark
Galeotti, a Russian security specialist at New York University, noted about
the recent exercises, “In general terms, this is what a military does if it
wants to keep at readiness. But in circumstances like this, they’re very aware
of the political implications of any movements.”
Any
serious invasion would require far larger numbers of Russian troops to
effectively occupy eastern Ukraine. It would also require units to be brought
up to full readiness (despite efforts to professionalize the military with
kontraktniki — contract or professional soldiers — the military still relies
on conscripts and the mass mobilization of understaffed units). And as Johan
Norberg notes over at the Carnegie
Endowment, an invasion would require the construction of field hospitals close to the border
(although one could argue that field hospitals would be part of any mobilization).
Additionally,
Russia would likely call upon its Interior Ministry troops (VV) to support an
invasion of eastern Ukraine. The VV troops are well trained but lightly armed
troops that have played a paramount role in conflicts in Chechnya, and as such
would be ideal for the kind of counter insurgency situation that could result
in Ukraine. They include the 2nd Independent Special
Designation Division, 47th Independent Special Designation Brigade (both based
in Krasnodar next to Ukraine), along with several special operations forces,
such as the 15thSpecial Purpose Detachment (OSN) “Vyatich,” an
elite special forces unit.
Since
few predicted the Russian occupation of Crimea, it would be premature to rule
out the possibility of a full-scale invasion. While it would seem unlikely that
Russian troops would march on Kyiv, some sort of limited incursion into the
Russian leaning east of the country is a very real possibility. The airborne
forces and Spetsnaz units that would spearhead such an assault are available
and close to the border. But those units would need to be backed up by larger
regular Russian military formations after the initial incursion.
Whatever
the future holds for the rest of Ukraine, it’s clear that Russia is staying put
in Crimea.
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