Betwixt and between
Date: 15 May 2012
Veronika Pulišová, a Slovakian analyst, asks the
question in New Eastern Europe: If the Cold War is over, why is there still a country “between Europe
and Russia”?
Ukraine is still being referred to as a country
“between Europe and Russia” not only in ordinary public discourse and media but
by top officials and diplomats, those in the US, EU and Russia, first and
foremost, but also in Ukraine itself. Why there is such an “in-betweenness”,
two decades after the end of the Cold War?
In her opening remarks to the U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations hearings on Ukraine on February 1st, 2012, labelled “Ukraine
at a Crossroads: What’s at Stake for the US and Europe?”, the U.S. Senator for
New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen introduced Ukraine as one of the largest and most
strategically located countries on the European continent, literally and
figuratively lying “at the crossroads between Europe and Russia”. In a similar
vein, she was followed by a testimony by, Steven Pifer from the Brookings
Institution, in Washington DC, criticising President Viktor Yanukovych’s
domestic policies for seriously undermining Ukraine’s ability to balance its
relationship “between the West and Russia”.
Balance or buffer zone?
“With weaker relations with the West,” Pifer argues,
“Kyiv will find that it has less room for manoeuvre in its dealings with
Moscow”. By stating that the overall goal of the US and the EU policy should be
to face Yanukovych with the choice as clearly as possible and to crystallize
the choice in his mind, Pifer strictly juxtaposes Ukraine’s friendlier and
stronger relationship with what he calls “the West” on the one hand, with
closer ties with Russia on the other hand. One could easily continue to
enumerate examples where the US posited that Ukraine has to balance its
relations with East and West in terms of foreign and security policy.
Considering such a black-and-white dichotomy, it is understandable why Ukraine
is often denominated as a “grey zone” or “buffer zone”, and why Kanwal Sibal,
an Indian diplomat and the first grand doctor of philosophy in India, might be
right when he argued at the Kyiv Security Forum on April 20th 2012, that it
will take a long time for the multi-polar world to become a reality.
The question is why buffer zones like Ukraine, keeping
a safe distance between allegedly former enemies, have not disappeared after
the fall of the Iron Curtain. One can agree with Steven Pifer that Ukrainian
Presidents and their administrations “have generally sought a balance in their
foreign policy relationships between the West and Russia”. The balancing has
been a common bone of content in mutual “West-Ukraine-Russia” relations. But
one should also ask oneself whether the Ukraine has ever had another option but
to balance and make such choices.
Who and why has nourished the realistic vision of a
necessity to choose between the East and West? It is not just the United
States. Politicians or commentators from all around the world continue to
vehemently use the term “West” in their public appearances and keep the
East-West dichotomy or some kind of “a neo-Cold War mythology”
alive by referring to it directly or indirectly in international official and
public discourse, ordinarily translated into concrete actions. Despite
occasional showcases of the U.S.-Russia, EU-Russia reconciliation or attempts
to build “strategic partnerships”; crucial decisions like voting on the UN
Security Council resolutions and other important international moves like
building regional alliances have mostly reflected the traditional cleavage,
while both sides are well aware of it. Behaviour of power hubs in the current
EU’s Eastern neighbourhood in the realm of foreign and security policy,
including energy security issues, is just one example.
On the one hand, the EU and Russia declare and make
some steps to bind Ukraine closer to them (that tells us something about
genuineness of their growing together). On the other hand, neither of them is
eager enough to solve the country’s integration impasse and neither the
Euro-Atlantic community, nor Russia seems to be bothered the status-quo too
much. On some occasions, their interaction inappropriately bypasses Ukraine.
For instance, in relation to Russia’s pressure on Ukraine concerning the gas
market and trade, Ukraine’s hopes of being supported by the EU-established and
promoted Energy Community (of which Ukraine has become a full-fledged member)
in negotiations with Moscow has not met with reality. What
is more, Russian alternative pipeline projects (the South Stream and the Nord
Stream) backed by some political figures from the Energy Community member
states diminish the importance of Ukraine as an important energy transit
country.
Two decades after the end of the Cold War, the choice
Ukraine faces should not be posed as “between Europe and Russia” or “between
the West and Russia”, in other words, between the Euro-Atlantic integration
structures and counter-structures driven by Russia. After all, “[i]n many respects, this is a false
choice”. However, for Ukraine not to choose and stay
in-between as to the foreign, security and defence policy and alliances – the
way Ukraine pursues through declaring a so-called “non-block status” of the
country – is not only less meaningful but, taking into account the neo-Cold War
hints, coming to terms with being “a buffer zone” for an infinite time might be
more dangerous, as a matter of fact.
The country insecure(d)
In the summer 2010, Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s
Parliament) officially abandoned the country’s aspirations to join NATO, the
move connected to the adoption of the law on fundamentals of Ukraine’s domestic
and foreign policy by Yanukovych’s administration. According to the law,
Ukraine is claimed to be a European “non-block” (“non-aligned”) state, while
being interested in the continuation of a constructive co-operation with NATO
rather than in membership. There have been numerous discussions on what this
non-alignment means. I dare to claim that first and foremost, it is a
rhetorical construct to avoid irritating NATO and Russia. Despite some
Ukrainians’ (not only politicians’) wishful thinking, in no way it implies
neutrality of the country. Decision-makers have often behaved as if they were
preparing to be integrated with “the West” and Russia at the same time,
depending on the issue under discussion; they have checked for what both sides
are doing and reacted accordingly. By doing so, have not they themselves been
disproving a viability of their construct?
Another thing is, as one NATO official made the point, if
the non-bloc status meant neutrality, Ukraine should be prepared to defend
itself alone. But “non-bloc status or neutrality is costly” and
Ukraine cannot afford it – not only because of finances but due to the
geopolitics which (especially the incumbent) Ukrainian elites, strikingly
enough, sometimes formulate as their device rather than a setback.
In other words, as Nicu Popescu stated at the Kyiv
Security Forum, the Ukrainian government poses itself as being of crucial
importance for all the regional power hubs and expects them to “pay” for
winning Ukraine’s favour. They tend to proudly overemphasize the geopolitical
significance of the country and deem that Ukraine can live like Austria or
Switzerland which are deep inside Europe and not on its outskirts. The question
posed by the Ambassador and long-standing, continuously pro-EU figure in
Ukrainian politics, Mr. Tarasyuk, is thus very pertinent in this respect: “How
can Ukraine, in a non-bloc manner, [and constrained in terms of hard security]
resist the growing global challenges…?”
Despite official declarations that Yanukovych has made
in terms of EU integration as a main objective of Ukraine’s foreign policy; the
security guarantees provided by the EU integration, or, for this moment in case
of Ukraine, closer economic and political association with the EU, are
primarily of a soft nature: strong interdependence, unshakeable respect for the
rule of law, mutual trust and intensive co-operation, sharing, adherence to
common rules, norms and values of democracy and free market economy, and a good
portion of negotiation skills and diplomacy, above all that.
Diplomacy, or lack of it
Ukraine hardly falls into these categories. In fact,
it faces substantial difficulties to go along the EU-performed lines. There is
an essential problem in Ukraine even with the last category – diplomacy – which
could be nourished well, irrespective of the extent of association with the EU.
The very basic of diplomacy is communication and generally, Yanukovych’s
administration is somehow not capable of communicating properly. Ukrainian
elites refuse to communicate and expose themselves to questions, open
discussions and potential critical remarks not only by individuals such as
analysts and scholars from abroad but also to domestic interlocutors at lower
levels of politico-societal hierarchies. With a few exceptions, they usually
avoid making their contact details public or offering them personally. At the
moment, Ukrainian diplomacy adhering to the governmental structures is a master
in showing disrespect to others.
A recent vivid example is the 5th Kyiv Security Forum
in April 2012. Bernard Kouchner, Karel Schwarzenberg, Nicu Popescu, Kanwal
Sibal and others from all around the world managed to come to Kyiv to discuss
Ukraine’s state of affairs in an international context but the incumbent
Ukrainian officials meant to speak somehow did not. The Kyiv Security Forum
thus went without “official Kyiv”. One can also recall numerous occasions where
Ukraine’s state “cream of the crop” representatives have appeared, made
statements, held dialogue with Brussels, Moscow and other capitals, but have
caused an outrage by their performance.
Paradoxically, it is Ukraine where such diplomacy
aspires to manage the country’s impasse and guarantee its security with its
skills alone.
Veronika Pulišová is a research assistant and PhD
student at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations,
Comenius University in Bratislava.
The author’s work has been supported by the Ryoichi
Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund (SYLFF). She would also like to thank to
Ms. Iryna Bochar and the Open Ukraine Foundation for inviting her to the 5th Kyiv
Security Forum.
http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/317
Back to previous page
Print this article
Add your comment:
Open all references in tabs: [1 – 6]